(This paper was presented in the International Conference at Mumbai on 5th & 6th January 2017 and was published in the book titled "India's Extended Neighbourhood", Ed. by Dr Wagh)
Abstract
A fundamental sense of nuclear
doctrine is to provide raison d’etre for having nuclear weapons [2009: Singh
Manpreet]. In this domain India’s official stand believe that basic policy
orientation of nuclear weapons is meant for simple ‘deterrence usage’ and “Cold
Start”, which per se encompasses ‘no first use policy’ [2013:Michael Krepon
& Julia Thompson]. In this orientation the New Delhi has evolved a policy
of ‘credible minimum deterrence’ [2008: Bharat Karnad]. It is pertinent to
mention that the India’s nuclear system is three stage based wherein India is
sufficient in thorium and deficient in uranium. It is this deficiency, which
halts a progressive credibility of its nuclear program. The other reason is India’s
neighboring nuclear powers that peruse irredentist designs, in particular with
regard to the Chinese and the Pakistan’s.
The Indo-US nuclear agreement,
which is also known as 123 agreement has brought a new “epoch” in the India’s
nuclear programme since its unveiling in July 18, 2005, by then Indian Prime
Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and his US counterpart President George Bush. The
123 agreement has ended India’s sense of ‘apartheism’ [1998: Jaswant Singh]. It
is pertinent to mention that the India’s nuclear tests in 1974 and then in 1998
has halted its future progress due to the international sanctions particularly
with regard to access of duel use technology and reprocessing technology. The
123 agreement has opened new gates for India and it has culminated a period of
‘exclusion’ for accessing a new technology in the domain of nuclear field. It
is also path breaking in accessing a membership in nuclear regimes particularly
in NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) and United Nations Security Council.
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